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ANDREW BECKERMAN-RODAU*
Patents Are Property: A Fundamental
But Important Concept
THE U.S. ECONOMY IS LARGELY BASED ON A FREE MARKET model which favors com-
petition over government regulation. Strong private property rights are a necessary
underlying element of a successful free market economy.' United States law has
long reflected this view.2 Once something is legally designated as property, the law
provides certain rights to the owner of that property.3 Those rights, often referred
to as a bundle of rights, give the owner the right to decide how property is used.4
This includes the right to permit or exclude others from using the property and the
right to freely transfer all or a part of the property to others.' Typically, the law
allows a property owner to exclude unauthorized invasion of property via injunc-
tive relief without regard to whether the invasion results in any damage.6 The mere
non-permissive invasion of property rights is actionable under a trespass theory.7
This is in contrast to other bodies of law.8 In an action for breach of contract, for
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1. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (1972) ("[Tlhe legal protection of property
rights has an important economic function: to create incentives to use resources efficiently."). See generally D.T.
ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST: ECONOMIC THEORY AND LEGAL CASES (1972) (implying that the U.S.
economy primarily utilizes private property).
2. See Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, REGULATION, Winter
2007, at 58 (stating that the U.S. has a strong tradition of private property rights).
3. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (Mosk, ., dissenting),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 414-15 (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that
property owners have the right to exclude others and that trespassers can be held liable even if no damage
caused).
7. See id. at 415.
8. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)
(requiring proof of damages in order to recover in a negligence cause of action).
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example, damages are a necessary element.' Likewise, a tort action for negligence or
product liability requires proof of damages.'"
It is generally recognized that patents are intangible personal property." The
United States Constitution's clause enabling Congress to enact patent law specifi-
cally states that the law shall grant an exclusive right in inventions to inventors.
An exclusive right is merely another way of referring to a property right. 3 The
current patent statute expressly states that patents are property. 4 This is affirmed
by numerous Supreme Court decisions" and lower court decisions 6 holding that
patents are property. Consequently, patent owners should be entitled to protect
patent property rights from invasion of third parties without regard to whether the
patent owner is injured by infringement. 7 This was the longstanding black letter
law" prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.' 9
Patent owners, like all property owners, are not unconditionally entitled to prop-
erty-based remedies for infringement. Traditionally, property owners are entitled
to remedies that vindicate unrestricted use of property if a countervailing public
policy does not exist.z If such a policy does exist, it may need to be balanced
against a property owner's rights.22 All property rights are subject to limitations
9. Ledain v. Ontario, 746 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) ("The common law elements of a cause
of action for breach of contract are (1) formation of a contract between plaintiff and defendant, (2) perform-
ance by plaintiff, (3) defendant's failure to perform, and (4) resulting damage."), affd, 759 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003).
10. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 164-65.
11. See, e.g., Fleming v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 157 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1946) (stating that patents are
intangible personal property); Adams Outdoor Adver. v. City of Madison, 717 N.W.2d 803, 820-21 (Wis.
2006); Analogic Corp. v. Bd. of Assessors of Peabody, 700 N.E.2d 548, 552 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries ... ." Id.
13. See generally Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference .... "); id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("An
essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.").
14. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999); Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S.
225, 226 (1876); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1871).
16. See, e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Blum v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d
281, 287 (3rd Cir. 1950); Heywood-Wakefield Co. v. Small, 96 F.2d 496, 500 (1st Cir. 1938).
17. Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 259 F. Supp. 2d 192, 194-95 (D. Conn. 2003).
18. Cont'l Paper Bag v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908); see also Jeneric/Pentron, 259 F. Supp.
2d at 194 (stating that a permanent injunction is the general remedy for patent infringement).
19. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that patent owners are not entitled to the property-based remedy of
permanent injunctive relief for patent infringement).
20. Id.
21. See id. at 396-97 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
22. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 195 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining the balance of public policy
considerations justifying the restriction of property rights).
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necessary for the furtherance of countervailing public policies.23 Restrictions at-
tached to the sale of real property-such as total restraints on alienation-are usu-
ally void as a matter of law.24 The public benefit of free marketability of property
typically outweighs the property owner's right to prohibit transferability by a pur-
chaser of his or her property.25 The existence of nuisance law, zoning law, and land
use regulations can limit a real property owner's freedom to engage in certain oth-
erwise legal uses of property.26 However, such restrictions are viewed as necessary,
in some circumstances, for the benefit of the public.27 Use and resale restrictions
may also apply to tangible personal property to further certain public policies.2"
Intellectual property rights under both copyright law29 and trademark law are also
subject to limitations based on the importance of free speech encapsulated in the
First Amendment.30
Determining whether public policy limitations should restrict traditional prop-
erty-based remedies for patent infringement requires an examination of the justifi-
cation for protecting patent rights.3' Fostering innovation, the classic argument in
favor of patents,32 is expressly enshrined in the Constitution 3  and recognized as
legitimate by most commentators and economists.34
23. See, e.g., G6sta Schindler, Wagging the Dog? Reconsidering Antitrust-Based Regulation of IP-Licensing, 12
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 49, 82 (2008) ("Easements, servitudes, or the laws of nuisance are general exam-
ples of legal limitation of property rights induced by social or public policy considerations."); Robert P. Burns,
Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CiN. L. REV. 67, 85 (1985) ("Although private
property is said to be an absolute right, the protection of which is a primary aim of government, absolute rights
are largely sacrificed for the blessings of civil society.").
24. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 22, at 195 (stating that absolute restraints on the alienation of fee
simple estates are void).
25. See id.
26. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 512 (explaining that government can control private land
use through regulation).
27. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509-10 nn.6-7 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (explaining that public health and safety lead to the restriction of some property rights).
28. See, e.g., id. at 510 n.10 (stating that under California law, a licensed sportswoman can give away wild
fish and game she has caught or killed, but she cannot sell them).
29. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (explaining that the fair use exception allows for otherwise infringing
uses of copyright protected property under certain circumstances).
30. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006) (allowing the use of a trademark for comparative advertising,
noncommercial use and for news reporting without penalty).
31. But see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (allowing use of public interest
to restrict the property-based remedy of injunctive relief without examining justifications for protecting prop-
erty rights).
32. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents ... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of ... inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'").
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 993-94 (1997). Some commentators and economists who argue that patents stifle competition view the
solution as modifying, rather than abolishing, current patent law. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
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Substantial investments of labor and capital for developing innovative products
will only occur in a free market economic system if the potential exists for a mone-
tary return. 5 This basic concept is codified in the Constitution36 which incentivizes
inventors to engage in development of innovations with the economic potential of
property rights in those innovations. 7 The resulting fruits of this inventive conduct
benefit society in general which is the ultimate goal of patent law."
The second justification for patent law is the increase in the public storehouse of
knowledge that results from the public disclosure of patented innovations.39 This is
insured by strict public disclosure requirements included in the patent law.4" These
requirements mandate that a patent application and any subsequently issued patent
must fully enable a person knowledgeable in the relevant area of technology to
make and use the invention based on the disclosed information." Patent applica-
tions are generally made available to the public eighteen months after being filed
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 2 If the patent is rejected, the informa-
tion contained in the application remains in the public domain. If the patent is
granted, the patent and the entire written record of the adversary process involved
in obtaining the patent is released to the public.43
Patents, despite being property, should be denied property-based remedies for
infringement only if legitimate countervailing public policy interests outweigh
granting traditional property remedies.44 This requires a critical examination of the
asserted reasons for limiting or restricting the economic value of patents.
Opponents of patent law often argue that patents create monopolies, thus
preventing some members of society from being able to acquire certain patented
products.4" However, the vast majority of patents, despite high acquisition costs,
35. Lemley, supra note 34, at 994.
36. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
37. The incentive is the grant of an "exclusive Right" which is essentially a property right. Id.
38. The goal is "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts ...." Id.
39. Peter Fox, Comment, It's Not Over for the Product of Nature Doctrine Until the Synthetic Super-Heavy
Element ("SHE") Sings, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (2006) (stating that the goal of patent law is the disclosure
of invention to the public); see also Bradford L. Smith & Susan 0. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 263 (2004) (conclud-
ing that public disclosure of an invention by a patent enlarges the body of technological know-how on which
future inventors can build).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 122(b)(1)(A).
43. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office maintains an official, publicly available, online database of
issued patents. See Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov (last visited July 30,
2008).
44. See, e.g., MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420 (N.D. Ohio 2007) ("ITlhe
public interest supports an injunction [for patent infringement]. There is a general public interest in favor of
strong patent protection, except in cases where an obvious public interest such as public health and safety
exists."), rev'd on other grounds, 258 F. App'x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
45. See Solveig Singleton, The Patent Prejudice: Intellectual Property as Monopoly, THE PROGRESS & FREE-
DOM FOUNDATION (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.pff.orglissues-pubs/pops/popl3.28intellectualproperty
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fail to generate substantial revenue.46 Often, little market demand exists for the
invention.47 Additionally, market substitutes frequently exist for patented inven-
tions that prevent the patent owner from being able to exert significant market
power.48
A minority of patents generate substantial revenue.49 The pharmaceutical indus-
try, for example, relies heavily on patents to generate substantial profits." Although
the inability to obtain a patented product is frequently not problematic, this may
be untrue if the invention is a life-saving pharmaceutical.5 This makes the pharma-
ceutical industry a common target for anti-patent advocates. 2 The high cost of
patented prescription drugs undoubtedly leads to some patients being denied ap-
propriate treatment." Reducing the economic value of patents by limiting the avail-
ability of property-based remedies for infringement has superficial appeal in terms
of acting as a method of reducing the cost of pharmaceuticals, thereby making
them more widely available.14 However, the more likely result will be less invest-
ment in pharmaceutical research which will produce fewer life-saving drugs.5" Ad-
asmonopoly.pdf (considering the argument that intellectual property created monopolies); Thomas J.
Krumenacher, Protection for Indigenous Peoples and their Traditional Knowledge: Would a Registry System Reduce
the Misappropriation of Traditional Knowledge?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 147 (2004) (criticizing
Western patent laws because they prevent access to patented medicines). But see Fox, supra note 39, at 1011
(explaining how public policy considerations trump monopoly concerns).
46. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litiga-
tion, 9 LEwIs & CLARK L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (stating that 10% of patents account for 80-90% of economic return
on patents).
47. Wendy Yang, Note, Patent Policy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion from
Patentability, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5, n.70 (1995) (stating that, with one exception, medical procedure
patents have been in low demand); see also Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention:
A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 1, 3-5 (2000) (discussing the use of patents as marketing devices rather than as protection of intellec-
tual property).
48. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 1041 (noting that most patents fail to produce any market power).
49. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 46, at 8.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Tracy Collins, Note, The Pharmaceutical Companies Versus AIDS Victims: A Classic Case of Bad
Versus Good? A Look at the Struggle Between International Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Treatment, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 159, 165 (2001) (discussing various alternative methods that countries employ to
increase accessibility to life-saving medications for their citizens).
52. Roger Bate, An Exit Strategy for Big Pharma, AMERICAN, Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.american.com
archive/2007/november- 11-07/an-exit-strategy-for-big-pharma.
53. Sean Flynn, Legal Strategies for Expanding Access to Medicines, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 535, 540-41
(2003) ("The median household income is only about $1000 a year. It is fair to say that the $2000 price tag for
[AIDS-related virus drugs] in South Africa, and the $750 public sector price, puts the drugs far out of reach of
most people in need.").
54. But see id. at 545 (arguing that transforming the patent right from a property rule to a liability rule can
increase access to life-saving pharmaceuticals while allowing patent holders to retain their patents and receive
royalties).
55. F. M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States 5-6 (Harvard Univ.
John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Working Paper Group, Paper No. RWP07-042, Sept. 2007), available at http://
www.researchoninnovation.org/scherer/patpolic.pdf (noting that research and development within the phar-
maceutical industry would experience a greater negative impact in the absence of traditional patent protection
than other industries).
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ditionally, the high profit potential from patented pharmaceuticals can be pro-
competition. 6 A successful drug creates or establishes the existence of a lucrative
product market.57 This provides an economic incentive for competitors to develop
new drugs that provide the same benefits in order to capitalize on the established
market.5" This also creates marketplace alternatives that can limit the market power
of a single producer and restrict prices. 9 Moreover, an incentive exists to improve
existing drugs to gain market share.6" All of this conduct ultimately benefits the
public.6 Most notably, when a patent expires and a patented drug enters the public
domain, generic drug manufacturers can produce and sell the drug covered by
expired patents at greatly reduced prices while still earning substantial profits.62
This is possible because the generic producers do not have to recoup huge drug
development costs.63 Absent the original research and development by the patent
owners, generic drug manufacturers will have nothing to produce.
The proliferation of non-practicing entities,64 derisively called patent trolls, 65 is a
frequent basis for asserting the need to reduce the economic value of patents by
56. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implica-
tions for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185,
205-06 (1999) (discussing that the hypercompetitiveness within the pharmaceutical industry is leading to re-
petitive R&D efforts, but is also contributing to a rapidly increasing pool of public knowledge).
57. Michael Sertic, Muddying the Waters: How the Supreme Court's Decision in Merck v. Integra Fails to
Resolve Problems of Judicial Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)(1), the "Safe Harbor" Provision of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 377, 431 (2007). A breakthrough drug is one that has no similar substitutes
on the market. Id. Thus, a breakthrough drug enjoys a period of pure market exclusivity, during which "the
potential exists for the breakthrough innovator to earn a relatively high return on R&D investment." Id.
58. Id. ("A lower-risk strategy for drug discovery firms is to develop me-too drugs, which act through an
identical mechanism as a breakthrough drug to treat the same medical indication.").
59. Id. ("The introduction of me-too drugs leads to competition in brand name drugs resulting in lower
pricing of both the breakthrough and me-too drugs ....").
60. See Smith & Mann, supra note 39, at 263 ("[Clompetitors who are unable to practice a patented
invention will often search for new ways to improve their products or solve a problem, and this search itself can
result in a further technological advance.").
61. Ashlee B. Mehl, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for Generic Drug Manufacturers: An
Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 649, 650 n.13 (2006) ("[T]he average price of a generic
prescription was half that of the same brand-name prescription, saving consumers an estimated eight to ten
billion dollars in 1994 alone." (quoting FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRA-
TION: AN FTC STUDY 9 (2002))).
62. See id. at 649-50 (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act facilitates FDA approval for generic drugs by
reducing the time and cost of the approval process, which ultimately benefits the consumer by providing access
to lower-priced off-patent drugs).
63. Sertic, supra note 57, 384-85 ("ITihe generic manufacturer is not required to repeat lengthy and costly
safety and efficacy testing required of the pioneer drug manufacturer as part of the Investigational New Drug
Application (IND) and New Drug Application (NDA) processes.") (footnotes omitted).
64. Miranda Jones, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name is Patently Not the Same: How
eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035, 1036 n.6
(2007) (non-practicing entities are companies that license patent rights but produce no products).
65. Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copy-
right and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 721 (2006) ("Patent troll is a derogatory term applied to small,
nonproducing inventors and patent-holding companies that file patent infringement claims against info-tech
companies in order to reap big payoffs.").
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weakening property-based remedies.66 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
eBay alludes to such entities as an underlying problem that justifies eliminating the
entitlement to a property-based remedy for patent infringement.67 This view coin-
cides with opinions expressed by some industry spokespersons who view trolls as
entities that merely drive up the cost of products without providing any public
benefit.6" However, the inventors behind the patents asserted by non-practicing en-
tities are often inventors who have been unsuccessful introducing an invention into
the marketplace.69 An inventor's lack of success often reflects an inability to raise
adequate capital and a lack of marketing expertise.7" In a successful free market
economy, specialization develops because it is efficient.7' Consequently, an inventor
may excel at innovation while other people excel at raising capital and providing
marketing. An inventor's patent helps to level the economic playing field by mak-
ing it difficult for dominant market enterprises to ignore inventors.73 Absent the
ability to assert patent property rights, fewer inventions will be patented and the
public storehouse of knowledge will decrease without the public disclosure from
those patents.74
66. Paul M. Schoenhard, Who Took My IP?-Defending the Availability of Injunctive Relief for Patent Own-
ers, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.l. 187, 188 (2008) ("[A] widespread fear of so-called 'patent trolls' has led to
proposed limitations on patentees' intellectual property rights.").
67. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When ...
the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be
sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.").
68. See, e.g., Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out at 'Patent Trolls', BBC NEWS, June 2, 2004, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3722509.stm (showing Intel Corp.'s chief patent counsel detailing the threat that
patent trolls pose to the industry).
69. See Antonio Regalado, Tiny Company Wields Patents Against Giants, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at BI
(describing a company that acquires intellectual property from inventors who were unsuccessful at entering the
market, pressures infringing companies into paying royalties or settlements, and shares the profits with the
inventors); see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting
the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 172 (2007)
("Frequently, the independent inventor or small startup lacks the enormous resources to bring a patent in-
fringement suit. In such cases, they may assign the patent to an entity that funds the infringement suit in return
for a percentage of any recovery.") (footnotes omitted).
70. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 69, at 172 (noting that startup companies often fail to convert a pat-
ented invention into a commercial success because they cannot raise adequate capital and lack marketing
expertise).
71. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICs 113 (David Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992). Specializa-
tion or division of labor, which is an important part of any successful free market economy, is defined as "[tlhe
process whereby labour is allocated to the activity in which it is most productive - i.e. in which it can make
best use of its skills. As a result no one person carries out all the tasks in the production ... ." Id.
72. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 69, at 172 (citing the inability to raise capital and to market the pat-
ented inventions as common reasons for startup failure).
73. See Sari Gabay, Note, The Patentability of Electronic Commerce Business Systems in the Aftermath of
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 8 J.L. & POL'Y 179, 222 (1999) (patents enable small
startup e-commerce enterprises to raise capital so they can compete with larger established enterprises);
Regalado, supra note 69 (noting that ownership of patents can level the playing field between large and small
businesses).
74. Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 255,
261 (2003) ("Patents encourage ingenuity, which results 'in an increase in the general knowledge base and
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Some industries complain that patents drive up the costs of making and selling
products.75 Those costs then act as an innovation tax that must ultimately be passed
on to consumers.76 Even if this argument is true, it must be analyzed in light of
several general aspects of the United States legal system. First, the law is frequently
used for social engineering. 77 Business enterprises are not permitted to operate in a
totally free marketplace. 78 For example, laws to protect worker health and safety,
and environmental regulations are imposed on business enterprises.79 These regula-
tions add costs that ultimately must be factored into the price of goods and passed
onto consumers.8" In light of this, expenses generated by the patent system are
simply another cost of doing business which is justified by the general societal
advantage of encouraging innovation for the ultimate benefit of the public.8'
A second and related factor is that law is typically neutral so it may affect entities
differently.82 While the electronics and software industries have asserted negative
economic consequences from the current patent system, the pharmaceutical indus-
try argues that the current patent system is vital for its economic survival. 3 In
particular, the electronics and software industries are strong supporters of weaken-
creates useful products for the public's benefit.'" (quoting Patricia A. Lacy, Gene Patenting: Universal Heritage
vs. Reward for Human Effort, 77 OR. L. REV. 783, 797 (1998))) (footnote omitted).
75. See Michael Chapin, Note, Sharing the Interoperability Ball on the Software Patent Playground, 14 B.U.
. Sci. & TECH. L. 220, 232-34 (2008) (noting that current patent standards stifle software innovation because
cost prohibition and network effects create a barrier to entry in the market); see also Bate, supra note 52
(discussing the anti-pharmaceutical patent group's promotion of compulsory licensing to reduce the cost of
pharmaceuticals and thereby increase access).
76. See Mike Dillon, Tax on Innovation, THE LEGAL THING, Sept. 14, 2006, http://blogs.sun.com/dillon/
entry/congressman smithcomes to.town (general counsel for Sun Microsystems commenting on lost reve-
nue attributed to patent trolls).
77. Frank V. Williams, 111, Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the State Courts, 29
CAMPBELL L. REV. 591, 717 (2007) ("Activists in the judiciary have accepted the reconstitution of the social
order as the goal of the judicial branch by redefining the judicial power. Consequently, we have a concept of
law as the multifaceted, coercive techniques of social engineering in the hands of judges.").
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (imposing restrictions on the formation of monopolies and on the conspiracy
to form monopolies); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (imposing restrictions on the production, use, sale, and im-
portation of patented inventions).
79. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2006) (requiring each employer to provide a workplace free from recog-
nized hazards that are "causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm"); 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a)
(2000) (prohibiting the transport of material for dumping into ocean waters).
80. Heather A. Steinmiller, Steel Industry Watch Out! The Kyoto Protocol is Lurking, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
161, 193-95 (2000) (positing that increased regulation in the energy industry could dramatically increase the
production cost of steel, and ultimately increase the price of products sold to consumers).
81. See generally Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (noting the patent system
"promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires.").
82. Compare Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 870-71
(2007) (explaining that the software industry grows by "incremental and cumulative" contributions, so that
progress almost always necessitates some form of patent infringement and can therefore be stifled by strict
patent protection), with Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 56, at 213-15 (discussing pharmaceutical research
and development's dependence on patent protection).
83. Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 56, at 214.
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ing property-based remedies for patent infringement84 while the pharmaceutical
industry supports strengthening property-based remedies."
It is impossible to tailor the law to reflect all the various market conditions faced
by different industries. 6 Likewise, modifying patent law to help one industry at the
expense of another is not in the interest of the public nor is it beneficial to our
economy over the long term. 7 This is especially true today with rapid technological
changes often affecting different segments of the marketplace in inconsistent and
unforeseen ways.8" Even if the patent law could simultaneously serve the needs of
individual industries, the rapid changes in technology would require never ending
modifications of the law.89 This would undermine the certainty and predictability
of the law which is a major strength of the United States legal system.9"
Different business entities must develop unique marketplace strategies to sur-
vive.91 This includes developing methods of dealing with patent-related costs in
conjunction with the many other unexpected changes in marketplace conditions in
a free market economy.92 For example, marketplace uncertainties such as the recent
84. See, e.g., Brief for Business Software Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 338 (2006) (No. 05-130) (urging the Court to adopt an equity-based test
to determine whether to grant an injunction as opposed to the current practice of automatically issuing an
injunction upon a showing of infringement); Brief for Nokia Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
5-6, MercExchange, 547 U.S. 338 (No. 05-130) (arguing for reversal of the Federal Circuit's automatic injunc-
tion rule in favor of an equity-based test).
85. See, e.g., Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2-3, MercExchange, 547 U.S. 338 (No. 05-130) (arguing against reversal of the automatic in-
junction rule in order to preserve strong patent protection and thereby safeguard the incentive to innovate).
86. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 56, at 213 (outlining the factors which make tailoring patent
systems to individual products difficult).
87. Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Flexible Patent Law... and Its Achilles Heel, WALL ST. J., May 11,
2007, at A9 (warning against making patent law flexible because it creates uncertainty, increases bureaucrat
discretion, and advantages companies with sizeable lobbying and litigation budgets).
88. Compare Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry's Decline, ROLLING STONE, Jun 28, 2007,
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/the-recordindustrysdecline/i ("[Tihe record business has
plunged into a historic decline."), with iTunes Music Store Sells Over One Million Songs in First Week, http://
www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/may/05musicstore.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
89. Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 56, at 213-14 (discussing the inability to create an industry-
specific patent system because the information required to do so is constantly shifting-demand, R&D costs,
market structure-and thus generally unobtainable).
90. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2006) (stating that stare decisis is "the basic legal princi-
ple that commands judicial respect for a court's earlier decisions and the rules of law they embody ...
Departure from precedent is exceptional, and requires 'special justification.' . . . This is especially true where
the principle has become settled through iteration and reiteration over a long period of time.") (citations
omitted). See generally David M. Becker, Debunking the Sanctity of Precedent, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 853, 854-55
(1998) (discussing the importance of certainty in law to ensure predictability).
91. John S. Brown, Research that Reinvents the Corporation, HARv. Bus. REV., Aug. 2002, at 105, 105
(citing rapid technological changes and unsteady business markets as forces propelling the need for constant
innovation, not only in product development but also in business practices and processes).
92. See Chapin, supra note 75, at 233-34 (identifying three methods-standard setting bodies, cross li-
cense agreements, and open source-that the software industry is currently using to ensure interoperability
despite the increasing difficulty to do so in light of patent-related costs, namely costly licensing fees to avoid
infringement).
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rise in fuel costs have impacted businesses by increasing overall costs which may be
difficult to pass onto consumers in the current weak economy." The airline indus-
try has been greatly impacted by higher fuel costs.94 Nevertheless, some airlines
have weathered the impact by effectively using financial transactions to hedge fuel
costs." Likewise, advances in digital technology coupled with widespread availabil-
ity of high speed Internet connections have ravaged certain segments of the en-
tertainment industry.96 The number of brick and mortar stores selling music on
CDs" and the number of video rental stores has precipitously declined over the last
few years.9" Both types of stores are likely to disappear in the future or be reduced
to serving a niche market.99
The weakening or limiting of property-based remedies for patent infringement is
not justified due to countervailing policies. Hence, robust property-based remedies
should be generally available to patent owners as a response to patent infringement.
93. Compare Donna Kardos, Baggage Fees, Job Cutbacks at Northwest, WALL: ST. J., July 10, 2008, at D4
(announcing that facing higher fuel costs, Northwest plans to cut jobs, charge for checked baggage, and raise
ticket prices), and Peter Pae, American Airlines to Charge for Checked Baggage, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2008, http://
travel.latimes.com/articles/la-trw-american22-2008may22 [hereinafter Pae, American Airlines) (announcing
that due to climbing fuel prices, American Airlines plans to charge for checked bags, reduce domestic flights,
and cut jobs), with Peter Pae, Southwest Airlines Reaps Benefits of Fuel Hedging Strategy, L.A. TIMES, May 30,
2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/30fbusiness/fi-southwest30 (noting that while other airlines raise
prices, charge for baggage, and lay off workers, Southwest is dropping prices due to the company's aggressive
fuel hedging strategy).
94. Aaron Smith, Airlines Hit Another Rough Spot, CNN MoNEY, July 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/
2008/07/11/news/companies/airlineindexl (reporting that the AMEX Airline Index dropped to the lowest
point in its thirteen year history).
95. See Pae, American Airlines, supra note 93.
96. See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 88; see also Anita Campbell, The Long Slow Decline of Video Stores,
BLOG CRITICS MAGAZINE, Feb. 13, 2004, http://blogcritics.orglarchives/2004/02/13/231940.php (predicting that
video stores will be obsolete in ten years as customers transition to renting films from cable and Internet
providers).
97. Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 88.
98. Campbell, supra note 96.
99. Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 88; Campbell supra note 96.
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